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I. NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
rhis is a plenary action brought by plaintiffs and 
cf'pcll;ir1tcs under§ 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953). as persons 
~, 3 cic'Jed by the decision of respondent Board of Adjustment 
,1envrng plaintiff's application to operate a home day care 
,,er'1ice fur six children, including their own preschool child. 
II. DISPOSITION BELOW 
District Court for Salt Lake 
~011nty, 
The Third Judicial 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin presiding, entered a 
ju,Jgmen t for respondents dismissing plaintiffs' and appellants' 
C':lmplaint with prejudice. This judgment was premised upon the 
district court's interpretation of the language "plenary 
cctiun" in § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as not expanding 
lhe scope of its analysis beyond that traditionally invoked by 
an appellate court in reviewing the decision of an 
actministrati ve body. The court, however, sua sponte, stayed 
its judg~ent pending appeal. 
II I. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the judgment dismissing their 
uDpl31nt reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to 
iudgment for appellants or, in the alternative, 
-1-
remanded with instruction that under § 10-9-15, Utah Code Arr, 
(1953), the district court is required to make its rnn 1 
independent consideration 
being limited by any 
presumptive validity of 
of the appropriate 
theory of appellate 
record without 
jurisdiction, 
the Board's decision or a standarci 
limiting review only for arbitrary or capricious action. 
IV. MATERIAL FACTS 
In order to fully consider the evidentiary issues 
raised herein and to have the required background for all of 
the issues presented, it is necessary to understand the genesis 
of this dispute including an earlier case involving the same 
parties but different issues. 
A. The First Lawsuit 
Plaintiffs and appellants, Diane and Craig Jorgensen, 
(hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "Jorgensens" 
or "plaintiffs") reside at 1398 Michigan Avenue in Salt Lake 
City with their three children, one of which is of preschool 
age and the other two are respectively in fourth grade and 
junior high. Mrs. Jorgensen began tending children in her hon 
in 1978. From that time to at or about the time of tl1e 
application to the Board of Adjustment 
referred to as "Board"), which is in 
tended no more than six children at one 
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(hereinafter sometimes 
issue, Mrs. Jorgensen 
time. Her tending of 
,jJJron was initiated at the request of friends and has always 
consistent with her desire to be in the home with her own 
preschool child. (Complaint, R. 2-3; Affidavit, R. 65-66; 
Affidavit contained in Def. Ex. 2). 
Mrs. Jorgensen had no complaints concerning her 
babysitting activities for almost two and one-half years. In 
the summer of 1980, a next door neighbor, the late Judge 
'lerrill Faux, complained to zoning authorities about Mrs. 
J nrgensen 1 s tending of 
Affidavit contained in Def. 
connection with what was 
neighbors. Based upon 
children. (Affidavit, 
Ex. 2) This complaint 
basically a squabble 
the complaint, the 
R. 65-66; 
was made in 
between two 
city zoning 
i!Uthorities took the position that Mrs. Jorgensen's tending of 
children was a zoning violation. (Def. Ex. 2) 
Mrs. Jorgensen appealed this decision to the Board of 
i\djust;nent on the grounds that her tending of children 
constituted a home occupation and was thus permitted under the 
zoning ordinances. ( Def • Ex • 2 ) • The issue before the Board 
in this 1980 proceeding was whether Mrs. Jorgensen's tending of 
children constituted a "home occupation" as that term was then 
defined in § 51-2-34 of the Salt Lake City ordinances. (The 
text of this ordinance definition is set forth in Appendix A of 
'"brief for convenience of reference). 
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A home occupation under the ordinance then requir,,,
1 
the following: (a) an incidental or secondary use rof , , 
residence when 
primary use; 
dwelling; (c) 
compared to d1-1elling purposes deemed to be the 
( b) absence of change in the character of the 
absence of display, stock in trade and employees; 
(d) absence of sale of commodities (excepting those produced on 
the premises), use of accessory building or yard or activity 
outside the main building. If Mrs. Jorgensen's tending of 
children was deemed a home occupation, it would be allowed in 
accordance 
51-14-1 ( 1). 
with 
(The 
the City 
text of 
Ordinances, §§ 51-13-1(9) and 
the ordinances then specifying 
appropriate uses of property in areas zoned R-1 and R-2, 
§§ 51-13-1 to -10 and 51-14-1 to -4, are also set forth in 
Appendix A for reference). 
The Board decided that Mrs. Jorgensen's tending of 
children was not a home occupation and the Jorgensen's filed a 
Complaint in Third District Court setting forth a plenary 
action as aggrieved persons pursuant to § 10-9-15, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). (Def. Ex. 2· Pl. Ex. l; Attachment I to Complaint 
in issue, R. 10-15). A preliminary injunction was entered 
allowing Mrs. Jorgensen to continue the tending of children 
limited to the number allowed under State regulations. 
(Findings and Order, Pl. Ex. 1) 
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During the pendency of the above referenced first 
, 1 t, s~lt Lake City adopted an ordinance specifically 
;:t,•Ul'J cr.1ld care facilities in all zoned areas upon the 
~r~nL1nu of an application and compliance with specified 
Li;nitcitions and conditions. (This new ordinance, No. 78 of 
H81 «;ntitled Child Care Facilities, is set forth in Appendix B 
of this brief for convenience of reference). The preamble of 
u1e new oi:dinance expressly stated the need for child care in 
the community and the compatibility of small group child care 
in residential neighborhoods. 
In December, 1981 following the adoption of the new 
ordinance, the parties to the lawsuit, Jorgensens and Salt Lake 
'~ity Corporation, by and through their respective counsel, 
st:ipulated to a dismissal of the lawsuit conditioned on Mrs. 
J or gens en's submission of an application under the new 
crdinance and the continuation of her child tending during the 
pendency of the application. (Complaint, R. 3-4; Answer, R. 25) 
B. The Second Lawsuit 
The second lawsuit, which is the subject of this 
"Preal, was the direct result of the Board's denial of Mrs. 
J•irgensen's application under the new ordinance. 
In accordance with the stipulation which terminated 
first la1;suit, Mrs. Jorgensen undertook the application 
became licensed by the State and submitted her 
-5-
application for a registered home day care service dS <le fl lie' i 
in the new ordinance, Section 51-2-17.15. Mrs. Jorge11seu 1 s 
application was limited to the tending of six children, 
including one of her own. Knm-ling that the neighborhood spat 
with her neighbor, Judge Faux, 1-ias continuing, Mrs. Jorgenser, 
pursued the application directly with the Board of Adjustment 
rather than seeking 1vaivers of objections from abutting 
landowners, such as Judge Faux, as permitted under Sect ion 
51-6-14(b) of the ne1-1 ordinance. (Application to Board and 
License from State of Utah contained in Pl. Ex. l; Findings and 
Order contained in Pl. Ex. 1) 
The Board published notices of its meeting at which 
the application of Mrs. Jorgensen was to be considered. 
Contrary to Mrs. Jorgensen's application <lnd the wording of the 
new ordinance itself (§ 51-2-17.15), the Board mischaracterized 
Mrs. Jorgensen's application as being one for a "preschool 
center" rather than as a registered home day care service. 
(Notice contained in Pl. Ex. 1). Two letters were received and 
specifically acknowledged by the Board from residents in the 
neighborhood specifically objecting to a facility referenced as 
a "preschool center." (Thomson and Stocking letters contained 
in P 1. Ex. 1) . 
The meeting was held on March 22, 
attended by only three of five Board members. 
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1982 and was 
(Exhibit 2 to 
1 :cororandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, R. 
At Least one of these three members expressed the 
serious concern that the objections to Mrs. Jorgensen's 
31Jpl1cation were irrelevant and the mere expression of three 
eUer ly people to a few children. (Statements of Board member 
Lewis in Findings and Order contained in Pl. Ex. 1). At this 
Boara meeting of March 22, 1982, no decision was made. 
The minutes of the March 22 meeting illustrate that 
some members of the Board had viewed the property. (Exhibit 2 
to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
The minutes do not indicate, however, that this was 
anything but the normal viewing from a city van which does not 
include a physical presence on the property or in the house and 
'.-1hich does not include a viewing of the very activities in 
question, the tending of six children. 
A second Board meeting was held on April 5, 1982. No 
notice was given of this meeting and it was thus not attended 
by Mrs. Jorgensen or her attorney. At this second meeting, 
1<nich 1;as attended by all five Board members, the Jorgensen 
1. This portion of the minutes is not contained in 
Pl, Ex. 1 which, at the hearing on the merits before Judge 
dui·]win upon which the judgment appealed from was based, was 
ce~cesented as being the complete record before the Board. 
2. See footnote 1. 
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application was considered, discussed and denied by a vol~ 
5-0. The two Board members who i1ad not attended the March ,, 
1982 meeting ::lid not recuse themselves and apparently 
participated in the deliberations and voting even though they 
had not been present for the presentation of Mrs. Jorgensen, 
her counsel and persons making comments at the first meeting. 
During this second meeting information was provided by 
Mr. Vernon Jorgensen, who is the City employee in charge of 
zoning. (Exhibit 3 to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, R. 
62-64; 3 Findings and Order contained in Pl. Ex. 1). 
The formal Find in gs and Order (contained in P 1. Ex. 1, 
expressly establish that the Board found that the neighborhood 
is composed of many elderly people al though there is no 
evidence in the record to support this. The affidavit of Mrs. 
4 
Jorgensen (R. 66, paragraph 4) is directly to the contrary. 
3. 
in Pl. Ex. 
the Board. 
This portion of the minutes is also 
1 which purports to be the complete 
See footnote 1, supra p. 7. 
not contained 
record before 
4. Plaintiffs point this out fully realizing that 
this affidavit is not part of the Board record to which the 
district court limited itself. While the referenced facts in 
the affidavit may not be part of the Board record, they do 
serve to illustrate exactly why there is absolutely no evidence 
in the record to the contrary in support of the Board's 
conclusion that Mrs. Jorgensen's tending of five children in 
addition to her own preschooler will change the character ot 
the neighborhood which allegedly is predominantly composed 0 ' 
elderly persons. 
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, ,,,,uc;n there is no supporting evidence, the Board concluded 
,, •hP Jorgensen application would be inconsistent with the 
c·;<iot1111j cnaracter of the neighborhood, i.e., elderly residents. 
Throughout the Findings and Order there are also 
1rnr;ierous references to the Board's view that applications such 
JS those of Mrs. Jorgensen can only be granted if they have the 
0 11pport of the neighborhood. This is verified by handwritten 
cc•Jtations on the last page of Mrs. Jorgensen's application 
·,ihich constitute a tabulation by the Board or city officials of 
notified neighbors who expressed objections. (Application 
~on ta ined in Pl. Ex. l). Finally, the only 11 evidence 11 
referenced by the Board of child tending constituting a 
nuisance is the following statement by one Board member: 
"[T]he fact that there are people in opposition, suggests there 
is a nuisance factor. 11 (Findings and Order, p. 3, contained in 
? l. Ex . l) . 
The formal Findings and Order denying Mrs. Jorgensen's 
arop: ication was dated April 19, 1982 and was signed by the 
Buard Chairman who had not attended the first meeting at which 
presentations were made by Mrs. Jorgensen, her counsel and 
~'cornbers of the public. The Jorgensens timely filed a Complaint 
Third District Court setting forth a "plenary action" as 
'·'csons aggrieved by the decision of the Board in accordance 
'·· 1' 1\ 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
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By agreement with zoning officials, Mrs. Jorg~nc 
terminated her child tending activities during the first ·;ice. 
of June, 1982. (Affidavit, R. 66-67). On August lG, 1982, ac, 
order was entered granting a preliminary injunction restraining 
respondents from preventing the Jorgensen's from tending 
children in their home. ( R. 87-88). 
The matter was heard on the merits on December 2, 1982 
at which time the court ruled that no evidence not previously 
before the Board would be received. Plaintiffs did not object 
to this specific ruling but did argue that the matter was to be 
heard de novo in the sense that the Board decision was not 
entitled to presumptive validity and the court was required to 
make its own independent analysis of the record without any 
limitation relating to the 
appellate review standard or 
application 
standard of 
of a 
review 
restrictive 
considering 
solely alleged abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious 
conduct by the Board. The court, over plaintiffs' objection, 
received Def. Ex. 2 which purports to be the record before the 
Board in the first proceeding which was limited to the home 
occupation issue. (Judgment, R. 118) The court, Judge Baldwin 
presiding, took the matter under advisement. (R. 96) A minute 
order of December 7, 1982, indicates that the court found in 
favor of defendants and against plaintiffs. The court, 
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sua sponte continued in effect the preliminary 
,1u,,cti::in during the pendency of any appeal. (R. 98). 
Respondents did not submit proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment until April 8, 1983. (R. 
121-32). Pli'l.intiffs filed objections on April 18, 1983. (R. 
l: ?·-14) . A hearing on the object ions was held on May 6, 1983 
anri the court sustained plaintiffs' objections. (R. 120) The 
form of judgment proposed by plaintiffs, with minor amendments, 
'.,as entered on May 6, 1983. (R. 117-19). This judgment 
accurately reflects the ruling of the court. 
The judgment recites the court's ruling that the 
Board's decision is entitled to a presumption of validity, that 
there is record evidence to support the Board's decision, that 
to reverse the decision of the Board would be to substitute the 
court's judgment for that of the Board which is prohibited by 
] 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and that the decision of the 
Bo2rd was not arbitrary or capricious. The judgment further 
"Xpressly contains a statement of the standard applied by the 
court which dictated the result reached: 
[T]he Court is of the opinion that its role 
pursuant to Section 10-9-15, U.C.A. (1953) 
is circumscribed and limited to the scope of 
review traditionally employed by a court of 
appellate jurisdiction. (R. 118) 
It is from this judgment that the Jorgensen's appeal. 
-11-
V. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
A. Did the district court err in applyiny 
restrictive appellate standard of review to the decision of L,:,, 
Board rather than considering anew the appropriate record awi 
applying its own independent judgment thereto? 
B. Did the district court erroneously admit intc 
evidence the record in the earlier Board proceeding, Def. Ex. 
2, over appellants' objection on the grounds of relevance, 
hearsay and lack of opportunity for cross-examination? 
C. Is there any sufficient evidence in the record~ 
support the decision of the Board and, 
procedural irregularities prejudicial? 
VI. ARGUMENT 
if SO, were the 
This appeal is the direct result of frustration of 
legislative purpose reflected in enactments 
§ 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953), and by 
by the legislature, 
the Salt Lake City 
Council, Ordinance No. 78 of 1981. The latter was frustrated 
by the Board of Adjustment when it denied Mrs. 
application for reasons directly contrary to 
Jorgensen's 
the policy 
statements made by the City Council in the prefactory portions 
of its new Child Care Facilities ordinance. The legislature's 
purposes, on the other hand, were frustrated by the district 
-12-
"r~ '" adoption of the most restrictive standard of review of 
"'·'1 decisions under§ 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
The first lavJSui t in this controversy served to 
the City Council's cure of the absolute and 
inappropriate ban on child tending in residential areas zoned 
R-1 and R-2. In the first lawsuit, appellants were required to 
rely on the "home occupation" provision of the ordinances in 
order to legitimatize child tending activities which were 
clearly compatible with residential zoning. Mrs. Jorgensen's 
cdse brought to a head a problem which existed for years under 
the City's interpretation of its zoning ordinances, which 
purportedly prohibited child tending in areas 
R-5. Notwithstanding, this interpretation 
zoned R-1 through 
the City simply 
qnored activities violative of this interpretation until a 
formal complaint such as that registered by Judge Faux against 
Jorgensens. 
The City was, however, well-aware of numerous 
•Ouseholds conducting the allegedly prohibited child care, was 
a.;are of the severe need for small group child care in 
residential areas and was further aware of its compatibility 
with residential zoning. As a consequence, during the pendency 
;f the first lawsuit the City Council legislatively corrected 
:_ie problem 1Vith its passage of the Child Care Facilities 
inance, tlo. 78 of 1981. (Appendix B). The prefatory 
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language of the ordinance expressly acknowledged "the need fo, 
the providing of quality child care within our community" ann 
"that small group care in residential family homes can provide 
a beneficial family atmosphere within residential neighborhoods 
without disrupting normal neighborhood characteristics." 
very 
The new ordinance appeared to allow 
activities in issue in appellants' 
and encourage the 
first lawsuit, 
Consequently, a stipulation for dismissal cleared the way for 
Mrs. Jorgensen to apply for permission to tend children under 
the new ordinance. The Board, however, rejected Mr, 
Jorgensen's application for reasons directly contrary to the 
express legislative findings in the new ordinance. The 
district court declined to rectify the Board's decision ~ 
adopting the most restrictive standard of review. The court, 
however, judiciously continued the preliminary injunction on 
its own motion during the predency of an appeal. Obviously, 
the district court merely viewed its role as being to maintain 
the status quo so that this Court could address the significant 
issue of the standard of review. 
The appeal to this Court presents a record and set of 
factual circumstances which clearly illustrate the necessity of 
significant judicial scrutiny of the decisions of the Board. 
This significant judicial scrutiny is not the result •Jc 
judicial legislation or the decision of an activist Court. 
-14-
)~. it is a mandate from the legislature reflected in 
!'J-9-15' Utah Code Ann. (19SJ) which unequivocally grants a 
aggrieved by any decision of the board 
ac1JUStment . a plenary action 
,.,.,,n of competent jurisdiction." 
for relief therefrom 
(Emphasis added). 
in 
The record in this 
leg1slutive wisdom reflected 
case 
in 
clearly 
10-9-15, 
illustrates 
Utah Code 
of 
any 
the 
Ann. 
(1953) in allm1ing a person aggrieved by a Board decision to 
present the controversy anew in a judicial forum which has been 
appropriately trained to be sensitive to concepts of 
fundamental fairness and the substantive and procedural due 
process protections afforded citizens like the Jorgensens. 
T·1is case is the antithesis of the old saying that "good facts 
rnake bad la1v." In this case the facts very clearly demonstrate 
th,2 need for the only and proper interpretation of the term 
"plenary action" contained in § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
The record before the Board (Pl. Ex. 1) establishes 
Lhe fol lowing : 
(1) the Board itself created adverse 
neighborhood reaction by erroneously characterizing 
Mrs. Jorgensen's application as one for "preschool 
center" rather than accurately as a registered home 
day care service; 
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( 2) while the record reveals that three of fi"'" 
Board members were driven by the Jorgensen property, 
there was no attempt by the Board to inspect the 
property or house or review the child tending 
activities in question; 
( 3) the Board erroneously assumed the 
neighborhood was predominantly composed of elderly 
persons merely because three people in opposition a: 
the hearing were elderly; 
( 4) contrary to express statements in the 
ordinance concerning the need for quality child care 
and the compatibility of small group care with 
residential purposes, a city zoning official, 
Mr. Vernon Jorgensen, led the Board to believe that an 
application for child care must be denied if there is 
any neighborhood opposition; 
(5) the Board erroneously concluded 
Mrs. Jorgensen's tending of five children and one of 
her own was a nuisance based solely on the fact there 
was some opposition to the application; 
( 6) the Board erroneously allowed the opposition 
of three elderly people to determine the nuisance 
question without considering whether the opposition 
merely reflected reactions of persons of extraordinary 
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serl3ibilities, extreme sensitivity, fastidious tastes, 
ill health or persons insistent upon exceptional 
freedom from any annoyance; 
( 7) there was no evidence of any disturbance 
resulting from the activities in issue, the tending of 
six small children; 5 
(8) the Board's decision was at least in part 
made without reference to the presentations of 
Mrs. Jorgensen and other interested persons insofar as 
two Board members voted against Mrs. Jorgensen's 
application without having attended the meeting of 
March 22 at which presentations were made; 
(9) the Board neither notified nor afforded 
M:::s. Jorgensen the opportunity to be heard at the 
April 5 meeting at which the final decision was made 
and information received from city zoning officials; 
(10) contrary to the new city ordinance, the 
Board completely failed to consider the granting of 
the application subject to conditions establishing 
neighborhood safeguards. 
5 · Board member Lewis pointed out during the first 
~'2Lir1g of March 22 that the subject matters of opposition did 
relate to child care. 
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These record facts indicate that a plenary act ioc
1 
allowed under § 10-9-15. Utah Code Ann. ( 1953) was necessary t' 
protect the Jorgensens from the improper decision of tlic 
Board. A court applying the proper standard of rev iev1 
represents the only forum for a just result untainted by the 
earlier proceedings and unwilling to allow its decision to be 
dictated by the loudest objectors. 
This case is not one that requires reliance on or 
citation to a legion of case precedent. The Utah statute 
allowing a plenary action is unique but its proper 
interpretation is simply a matter of application of the most 
fundamental concepts of statutory construction. The issue of 
the improper admission of the record of the first proceedinJ 
before the Board (Def. Ex. 2) is easily resolved by 
consideration of concepts of fundamental fairness, due process 
and basic relevance. 
unique 
A. A plenary action under § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) requires the district court to consider 
anew the record before the Board and apply its 
own independent judgment to the facts. 
§ 10-9-15, 
in its use 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
of the expressions 
(Appendix C) is 
"plenary action". 
Appellants have found no other statute using this term and no 
-18-
_, 111f_'( 1~ase interpreting the term. Most statutes dealing with 
c 1 of zoning decisions use such terms as "de novo", 
L" ' ' or 
11 review 11 • The Utah legislature had these other 
c L ·.t11tes as models or examples but instead chose the term 
"p1 enary action 11 • Consequently, the legislature had in mind 
tho.t the judiciary should conduct a more extensive and 
independent analysis of the record underlying the Board's 
le,_:i s ion than that normally conducted in reviewing 
administrative decisions. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "plenary" as 
"f :Jl l, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified", 
citing Maskunkushey v. Maskunkushey, 191 Okl. 501, 134 P.2d 
J76, 979 ( 1942). The American College Dictionary (1968) 
substantially the same definition. The term 
"plenary", then, has an unequivocally expansive meaning. The 
·:·J~bination of the term "plenary" with the term "action" in 
10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953) can only mean that aggrieved 
persons such as the Jorgensens have an unqualified action. 
The judgment of the district court (R. 117-19) did not 
recognize the proceeding as an unqualified action. Contrary to 
~his judgment in issue, an unqualified action can only be a 
pcoceecting in which the district court is not limited to a 
·'"'PP •')f review traditionally employed by a court of appellate 
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jurisdiction and cannot be a proceeding 
presumption of validity of the very decision 
tainted with 
in issue. L,l::; 
contrary to the express language of the judgment, o'. 
unqualified action is one in which the district court car. 
substitute its Judgment for that of the Board, not be 
restricted to a substantial evidence review or review solely 
for arbitrary and capricious conduct. 
A quick review of other Utah statutes indicates that 
other statutory 
legislature 
administrative 
administrative 
in 
characterizations were 
defining 
decision. 
decisions 
the 
For 
are 
scope 
example, 
actually 
available to the 
of review of 311 
some 
called 
review of 
"appeals", 
§ 58-22-19, Utah Code Ann. (1953) (Engineer and surveyor 
certification proceedings); § 17-30-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
(Merit Commission decisions re deputy sheriffs). Some statutes 
specifically delineate the requirement of reliance on the 
administrative record and specifically state that the 
proceeding shall not be by trial de novo. § 10-2-412, Utar. 
Code Ann. (1981 Supp.) (Appeal of Boundary Commission 
decisions). Other statutes specify trial de novo. § 31-4-9, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) (Appeal of Insurance Department orders). 
Still other statutes utilize the term "review" and specify th' 
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,",Jctrd ')f substantial evidence. § 58-8a-3, Utah Code Ann. 
1) (ttev1ew of Child Placing Agency decisions). 
The legislature chose none of these terms or 
It did not use such terms as "appeal", "review" 
,:;r "substantial evidence" even though these terms were known to 
,, and used in other administrative contexts. Instead, the 
1~g1slature chose the term "plenary action" which must now be 
,31ven its plain meaning. 
There is but a single Utah case in which the term 
"plenary" was considered in an administrative review context, 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 98 U. 431, 100 
?.2d 552 (1940). The statute in that case provided for a 
"rlenary review" which was to "proceed as a trial de nova." 
The Court there ruled that the term "plenary review" meant a 
fJll and complete review which increased the scope of the 
Court's review. Id. at 555. The holding of the case was that 
the statute required trial de novo on the administrative record 
'1 \thou t the taking of new evidence. 
The Denver Rio Grande case is authority that a plenary 
ar:-tion requires a full review of all facts and law. The term 
"trial de novo 11 in the applicable statute in the Denver Rio 
'~!~]~ case served only to raise the issue whether review was 
~ iI111 ted to the record or could be expanded to include new 
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evidence. 
intended. 
The Court held that the former was the alternati'ie 
Thus, the absence of the term "trial de novo" 1 , 
10-9-15 is of no consequence and does not 1 i mi t the ter,, 
"plenary action" to an appellate proceeding. 
The consequence of the district court's restricte~ 
review was that clearly prejudicial procedural defects and a 
record with little, if any, evidence to support the decision 
are now before this Court. Luckily, the district court sa1v fit 
to prevent 
preliminary 
judgment. 
any irreparable injury by keeping in 
injunction and staying enforcement 
This action of the district court on its 
force the 
of tne 
own motion 
perhaps indicates that the court's decision would have been 
contrary to the Board's decision had the court applied the 
proper standard of review. Failing that, the district court 
preserved the status quo so that this Court could give the 
authoritative interpretation of 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
which appellants submit requires reversal of the judgment below 
and establishment of a standard similar to that in the Ria 
Grande case. 
In their Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine, 
respondents cited a number of cases and al1thorities for the 
general proposition that in zoning matters courts apply a 
traditional appellate standard for review of administrative 
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Suffice it to say for the time being, the 
, ,ri·,ur1ries involve general zoning concepts without reference 
s pee if i c statutes, involve zoning statutes with 
0 ubsnntially different wording than the one in issue, or 
wvolve Utah administrative appeals under other statutes. 
1;illiams v. Zoning Adjustment Board of the City of Laramie, 383 
P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1963); Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Bd. 
of Comm. of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979); 
Peatross v. Bd. of Comm. of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 
(Utah 1976); BA McQuillan, Municipal Corporations§ 25.334 at 
p.472. 
B. The record in the earlier proceeding before the 
Board was irrelevant, hearsay and not subject to 
cross-examination and thus improperly admitted 
into evidence by the district court. 
When this matter was presented to the district court, 
it received as exhibits the record before the Board and the 
Board record in the earlier proceeding involving tl1e issue of 
home occupation. (Pl. Ex. l; Def. Ex 2). Appellants objected 
to the receipt of the latter record (Def. Ex. 2) on the grounds 
of relevance, nearsay and lack of opportunity for 
'cross-examination. 
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The basis of the relevance objection was that 
earlier proceeding involved d1 fferent time period and charijc: 
circumstances. Specifically the earlier proceeding involve: 
facts as of August, 1980, the time of the complaint by Judg, 
Faux, whereas the proceeding in 
March 5, 1982, the date of 
Evidence of conduct 19 months 
question involved facts as of 
Mrs. Jorge? sen' s application. 
earlier could not have been 
relevant to the second proceeding unless it was shown that the 
same evidence or facts persisted or began anew within ~e 
19 month interim. No such connecting evidence was submitted. 
Fur th er more, in the interim, in accordance with the 
preliminary injunction, Mrs. Jorgensen reduced the number o'. 
children tended in accordance with state regulation. Finally, 
in the interim Mrs. Jorgensen had been inspected, reviewed and 
licensed by the State Division of Family Services, thereby 
attesting to the acceptaoility of her child tending 
activities. (Copy of license attached to Jorgensen application 
contained in Pl. Ex. 1.) These facts of changed circumstances 
alone or, in combination with the passage of 19 months since 
the evidence in the first proceeding, establish under even the 
broadest view of relevance that the 1980 record in the Board 
proceedings considering the home occupation issue are and were 
inadmissible on the grounds of relevance. 
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The record in the earlier proceeding is on its face 
,,ea 1 Si</ and not within any of the exceptions delineated in the 
oppJ i ,;able Utah Rules of Evidence. This is not surprising 
sir1ce the matters contained in the record of the earlier 
prnceeding violate the Jorgensens' constitutional right of 
L·ross-examination if used in the second proceeding. This right 
of cross-examination is a fundamental right of due process and 
protected under the due process clauses of the United States 
and Utah cons ti tut ions. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
269-70 (1970); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 
U.S. 96, 103 (1963); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 
11972). This due process right of cross-examination is as 
applicable to administrative proceedings as it is to others 
wnen substantial rights are in issue. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); Doe v. United States Civil Service 
Comm~~·· 483 F.Supp. 539, 597 {S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
At the earlier hearing, as is usual in Board meetings, 
opplicants and others are not given the opportunity to 
cross-examine. In fact, the proceeding is not even a hearing. 
It is called a meeting, proceeds as such and all of the normal 
protections inherent in a hearing are missing. Moreover, even 
lf the opportunity for cross-examination had existed, it would 
have oeen of no consequence since the issues under the home 
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occupation ordinance, § 51-2-34, Salt Lake City Ordinance, 
involve the use of the dwelling and not change of character 
a neighborhood or nuisance which were the issues raised in tt,, 
second proceeding. 
Under such circumstances where there is not 
substantial identity of issues, testimony in a prior proceeding 
is not admissible in a subsequent one. McCormick, Evidence 
§ 257 at p. 621 (1972). A case which involves not only the 
substantial identity of issues proposition but also involves 
the issue of different time periods during which the purported 
facts existed is State v. Augustine, 252 La. 983, 215 So. 2ri 
634 (1968). In the Augustine case the court ruled that 
testimony given at 
not admissible on 
offense. These 
a hearing 
the issue 
authorities 
on competency to stand trial was 
of insanity at the time of the 
address the former testimony 
exception to the hearsay rule but underlying the concept is ~e 
fundamental right of cross-examination. Moreover, in the 
context of the former testimony exception, it is assumed that 
the subject hearsay has earlier 
McCormick, Evidence§ 255 (1972). 
been given under oath. 
The evidence in question, the record in the home 
occupation proceedings, should not have been received by the 
district court. The record was irrelevant, being based on 
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information and different circumstances existing 
,_; rncnt11s previous. The information contained therein was 
np"rsHy, not within an exception to the hearsay rule, not under 
oalh and its admission in court deprived appellants of their 
fllii<lamental right to cross-examine witnesses. The district 
court's admission of this record (Def. Ex. 2), not only taints 
its entire review of the proceeding but renders it impossible 
to negate that it was in this portion of the record that some 
evidence supporting the decision existed. Under such 
circumstances not only was the evidence inadmissible, its 
receipt was 
reversal. 
prejudicial and requires remand or outright 
C. There is insufficient evidence in the record to 
support the Board's decision and the procedural 
irregularities were an abuse of discretion, 
arbitrary, capricious and prejudicial. 
Regardless of the standard of review of the Board's 
decision mandated by 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953), an 
analysis of the record illustrates there is no evidence to 
support the decision. There was no evidence that the 
neighborhood was predominantly composed of elderly people. In 
ca ct, the only reason there was no evidence to the contrary was 
Deccause appellants did not even know this was an issue until 
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supplied with copies of the Board decision. There is 
evidence of nuisance. There 1vas no evidence of disturLance' 
which related to the conduct in issue, tending of six preschuu1 
children, as was noted by Board member Lewis. 
relevant evidence was that submitted by Mrs. Jorgensen at the 
hearing and in her application. This evidence conclusively 
established the appropriateness of the application and requir~ 
that it be granted. 
The Board did make a number of errors on the 
application of law to the evidence. For example, the Board 
determined that opposition from the neighborhood required 
denial of the application and established nuisance as a matter 
of law. This is contrary to the ordinance which encourages 
small group child care in residential areas. Furthermore, 
there is no logical, evident iary nexus between opposition and 
nuisance. If the law is otherwise, we would have not the 
tyranny of the majority but the tyranny of the loudest 
objector, which is exactly what happened before the Board. 
Moreover, the Board gave the opponents veto power over the 
application by assuming that the opposition of the elderly 
established a nuisance. The law of nuisance, however, requires 
that the activities in question be viewed from the perspective 
of the ordinary person. E.g., Erickson v. Hudson, 249 P.2d 52] 
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!_)c,_'J; Kasala v. Kalispell Pee Wee Baseball League, 439 
,.c, 1t1ont. 1968). This hypothetical reasonable person is a 
.L, l1ealthy person of ordinary sensibilities, not a 
·c·ecc,~'.1s1tive person, one of fastidious tastes, ill health or 
.cr.c insisting upon exceptional freedom from annoyance. E'...:..s.:_, 
'·\cPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, 248 P. 561 (Okl. 1926); 
Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Ore. 
l34SJ; Erickson v. Hudson, 249 P.2d 523 (Wyo. 1952). 
Perhaps the most egregious error committed by the 
Board was its absolutist attitude in denying Mrs. Jorgensen's 
3flpl ication. The new 
appropriate safeguards. 
city 
If the 
ordinance itself speaks 
Board felt compelled from 
of 
a 
puolic relations standpoint to give the opponents something, it 
could have granted the application subject to delineated 
c0n·Ji t ions which incorporated safeguards addressed to the 
factors raised by opponents. This, however, the Board did not 
even consider. 
The procedural errors are inextricably entwined with 
~nc substantive errors. There is unquestioned prejudice in the 
Board's mischaracterization of Mrs. Jorgensen's application. 
Two letters of opposition were received which made specific 
rof~rence to the application as being for a "preschool center", 
.,, u1dicated by the Board's notice and contrary to the 
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application for a home day care service. (Thomas and Stocki 1,,,, 
letters contained in Pl. Ex. 1.) It is reasonable to assume 
that at least two of the four opponents 1~ho appeared at the 
hearing were similarly misled. 
The procedural errors concerning the composition oi 
the Board at the two meet in gs of March 22 and Apr i 1 5, lack of 
notice of the April 5 meeting, and the failure of two members 
who voted against the Jorgensen application to attend the 
March 22 meeting 
meeting of which 
were similarly 
appellants were 
prejudicial. 
deliberations with members not 
given no 
at the 
At the April 5 
notice there were 
earlier meeting. 
Moreover, there was information supplied by zoning officials at 
the subsequent, unnoticed hearing. This alone establishes 
prejudice. When combined, however, with member Lewis' change 
of view between the meetings, it suggests that those members 
who did not attend the presentations at the March 22 meeting 
had a significant impact on the eventual outcome. 
The proceedings before the Board are riddled with 
errors, interpretive, substantive and procedural. The entire 
record indicates these is no evidentiary support for ~e 
Board's decision. What evidence there was, i.e., mere 
opposition, was improperly applied. The errors of law and 
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, , ,,,:e,dur.11 errors were serious, substantial and prejudicial and 
1t rsmdoJ to the district court, if not outright reversal. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This appeal presents an ideal factual setting for this 
court to interpret § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953). The facts 
are such that the wisdom of the legislature in requiring 
substantial judicial involvement by means of a plenary action 
is established. A plenary action wherein the court serves as 
:he ultimate factual and legal analyst is necessary to preserve 
Jue process rights and fulfill the concept of fundamental 
fairness. Otherwise boards of adjustment will continue to be 
pa,,ns of the loudest objectors and constitute mere vehicles for 
neighborhood plebesci tes. 
The ultimate result in the proceedings before the 
Board indicate the necessity of a plenary action. The Board 
prohibited activities in a residential setting which are 
exactly the same activities conducted by large families. Such 
arbitrary and capricious decisions cannot be allowed to endure. 
The judgment of the district court should be reversed 
wit_h instructions to enter judgment for appellants. Failing 
tb i3, at the mini mum appellants are entitled to a remand on the 
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appropriate standard of review and the admissibility of Det. 
Ex. 2. 
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APPENDIX A 
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 
HOME OCCUPATION 
SEC. 51-2-34. HOME OCCUPATION. "Home occupation" '.r. 
mean anv 1Jse conducted entirely within a building and carrie 
on by persons residing in the dwelling unit, which use is 
clearlv incidental and secondarv .to the use of the dwelling 
for dwelling purposes and does not change the character ther 
and in connection with which there is no display, nor stock· 
trade, nor any employees. The home occupation shall not inc 
the sale of commodities except those which are oroduced on'., 
premises, and shall not involve the use of any accessory bu1 
ing or yard or activity outside of the main building. 
RESIDENTIAL "R-1" DISTRICT 
SEC. 51-13-1. USE REGULATIONS. In a Residential "R< 
District no building or premises shall be used or maintaine: 
and no building shall be erected or altered so as to be am 
intended, or designed to be used for other than one or more 
the following uses: 
(1) Single-family dwellings. 
(2) Churches, except temporary revival tents or buildin. 
(3) Libraries, museums and public fire stations. 
(4) Public parks, public recreational grounds and buil·: 
but not including privately owned commercial amusement par\; 
commercial recreation grounds, or penal or mental instituo· 
( 5) Agriculture, but not including the keeping of an1mi 
or fowl other than those raised strictly for family food pr. 
duction, nurseries and greenhouses, provided there is not a 
retail shop operated in connection therewith, and provided 
the greenhouse is set back at least sixty (60) feet from the 
front property line. 
(6) Public schools and private educational instituti 11 
having a curriculum similar to that ordinarily given in pur 
lie schools, but not including privately owned trade, cha~ 
or dancing schools or music schools. 
("J Household pets. 
(3) Cemeteries adjoining or in extension to existing cem-
et~ries. 
(9) Home occupations. 
(10) Accessory uses and buildings customarily incident to 
che above. 
(11) Temporary buildings for uses incident to construction 
work, which buildings must be removed upon the completion or 
abandonment of the construction work. 
(12) Type of signs as follows: 
(a) Name plates. One nonilluminated name plate for 
each dwelling unit, not exceeding one and one-half ( 1 1/2) 
square feet in area, indicating the name of the occupant and/or a 
permitted home occupation. 
(b) Identification signs. One sign, not exceeding 
nine (9) square feet in area for conforming buildings or con-
forming uses other than dwellings, boarding houses or lodging 
houses. 
(c) Property signs. One or more signs not exceeding 
nrne ( 9) square feet in combined total area for each street 
frontage of the lot. In addition, one or more signs of a tem-
porarv nature for each approved subdivision under development, 
orovided such signs shall not exceed in combined total area 
t1>0 hundred (ZOO) square feet in area. In addition, one or 
more signs of a temporary nature for main buildings or uses 
under development other than dwellings, provided such signs 
shall not exceed in combined total area one hundred (100) square 
feet. 
(d) Public necessitv signs. One or more public nec-
issitv signs not exceeding twenty-four (24) square feet in com-
bined total area for each commercial or residential use lawfully 
occupving the premises, provided that no one sign shall exceed 
eight (3) square feet in area. .. 
(e) Service signs. One or more service signs not 
exceeding twenty-four (24) square feet in combined total area 
for each commercial or residential use lawfully occupying the 
premises, provided that no one sign shall exceed eight (8) 
square feet in area. 
(f) Business signs. One or more signs not exceeding 
in total area two (2) square feet for each one linear foot of 
frontage occupied b\! a non-conformini;; commercial or industrial 
tise, but in no case· shall tha total area of all signs exceed 
one hundred (100) square feet. Uses not occupying frontage 
~av each have one or more signs not exceeding forty (40) square 
t~et in combined total area. In addition thereto, temporary 
bu~1ne~s signs not exceeding one hundred (100) sq~are feet for 
e~ch commercial or industrial use lawfully occupying the pre-
~1;es, provided that no such temporary sign shall be erected 
tar more than thirty (30) days. 
(g) Location of signs. No oropertv signs, pubJi,: 
necessity or service signs mav be located closer than ten 
feet to anv propertv line. Name plats, business and ident' 
cation signs shall be located flat against the building, 
(13) One story accessorv buildings totaling not over _ 
hundred and twentv (720) square feet in area used for gara,, 
space, household storage, above ground bomb or fallout she> 
or other activities strictly accessory to the dwelling and. 
taining no special wiring or plumbing or other facilities m; 
possible conversion to living or commercial use. In addit:: 
covered patios open on at least three (3) sides shall be oe: 
mitted for patio purposes only either attached to an acces;c' 
building or as a detached structure or attached to the rear 
the home. If attached to the rear of the home at least a f" 
(15) foot open unoccupied area must be maintained between ti. 
patio roof line and the rear property line. All such access, 
buildings must be located in the rear yard and not less th~ 
sixty (60) feet from the front lot line, thirtv (30) feet k 
a corner lot on the side street, four (4) feet in rear of L 
main building, and fifteen (15) feet from any dwelling on u 
adjacent lot; and the total covered area cannot exceed fif~ 
(SO) percent of the rear yard area. 
SEC. 51-13-2. AREA REGULATIONS. The minimum area oL 
lot shall consist of seven thousand (7,000) square feet. In. 
district a lot extending to a side or rear public alley shaL 
be deemed to extend to the center of such public alley for 0 
purpose of computing its area. 
SEC. 51-13-3. SIDE YARD REGULATIONS. The minimum sii: 
yard for any main building shall be thirty-five (35) percent 
of the building height, but in no case less than eight (8) 
feet, and the total width of the two side yards for any one 
lot shall be seventy (70) percent of the building height, ~'. 
in no case less than twenty (20) feet. 
SEC. 51-13-4. FRONT YARD REGUU,TIONS. The minimum dee 
of the front yard for all main buildings shall be the averag: 
of the existing buildings within the same block frontage, ~, 
cept that a front yard need not be more than thirty (30) fee: 
in depth. Where the average alignment is less than fifteen 
(15) feet, a fifteen (15) foot front yard shall be required, 
Where there are no existing buildings within the same block 
frontage, the minimum depth shall be twenty (20) feet. 
SEC. 51-13-5. REAR YARD REGULATIONS. The minimum dep' 
of the rear yard for any main building shall be twenty-five 
(25) feet. 
SEC. 51-13-6. HEIGHT REGULATIONS. No building shall 
erected to a height in excess of thirty-five (35) feet, and· 
dwelling shall be erected to a height less than one (1) full 
story above grade. 
SEC. 51-13-7. CONDITIONAL USES IN HISTORIC BUILDINGS. 
in a Residential "R-1" District the Board of Adjustment may 
permit as a conditional use in historic buildings, the fol-
lowing uses: 
(1) Offices and accessory commercial uses as deemed ap-
propriate if designed for use by the occupants of and visitors 
to the offices; provided, that access to such uses is only from-
within the building and that there is no exterior evidence of 
such uses as signs or display windows. 
(2) Limited retail businesses which do not change the basic 
character of the building in the district in which it is located. 
SEC. 51-13-8. ASPECTS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT. The Board of Adjustment may approve an application 
for conditional uses if the facts presented are such as to es-
tablish: 
(1) That such use or feature as proposed will not be 
detrimental to the health, safety, convenience or general 
welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity, or 
injurious to property, improvements er potential development 
in the vicinity, with respect to aspects including but not 
limited to the following: 
The size and shape and arrangement of structures; 
The accessibility and traffic patterns for persons 
and vehicles, the type and volume of such traffic, and the 
adequacy of proposed off-street parking and loading; 
The safeguards afforded to prevent noxious or offen-
sive emmissions such as noise, glare, dust, and odor, and; 
The desirability of providing landscaping, screening, 
open spaces, parking and loading areas, service areas, lighting 
and signs. 
(2) That such us~~r feature as proposed will comply with 
the applicable provisions of this title and will not adversely 
affect the Master Plan of Salt Lake City; also 
(3) That such use or feature proposed is conducive to the 
preservation of the historic and/or architectural characteris-
tics of the building. 
SEC. 51-13-9. ASSURING PRESERVATION. When authorizing a 
conditional use as provided herein, the Board of Adjustment may 
prescribe such conditions as are in its opinion necessary to assure 
the preservation of the historic building for which the conditional 
use authorization is sought and such conditions as are necessary 
to secu1e the objectives of this title. Before the Board of Ad-
justment shall render a final decision on an application for a 
conditional use, it shall first secure the recommendation of 
the Salt Lake City Historical Building Committee and the re-
commendation of the Planning and Zoning Commission. 
SEC. 51-13-10. WHO MAY MAKE APPLICATION. Applications 
for conditional uses may be filed by the owner of the property 
for which the conditional use is sought, or his authorized re-
presentatives. 
RESIDENTIAL "R-2" DISTRICT 
SEC. 51-14-1. USE REGULATIONS. In a Residential "R 
District no building or structure or land shall be used and 
no building or structure shall be erected which is arranged 
intended, or designed to be used for other than one or more' 
of the following uses: ·· 
(1) Any use permitted in a Residential "R-1" District. 
(2) Two-family dwellings. 
(3) Dormitories, fraternity or sorority houses, or boaf 
houses occupied only by the faculty or students of any colle· 
or university and supervised by the authorities thereof, p~' 
vided, however, that such houses shall not be located or esta 
lished more than six hundred (600) feet distant from the la~ 
and premises owned and occupied by the institution to which 
they are incident; and provided, further, that for the purpo< 
of this section the lands and premises occupied by the Unive: 
of Utah and Westminster College shall be deemed to include~ 
the following properties: 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH: Commencing at the southeast corner 
of First South Street and University Street; thence south 
along the west boundary of the University of Utah to the Mtt 
line of Fifth South Street; thence east along the north line 
of Fifth South Street and Hempstead Road to the intersecti~ 
Hempstead Road and Wasatch Drive; thence northwesterly along 
Wasatch Drive to the intersection of Fort Douglas Boulevard; 
thence westerly along Fort Douglas Boulevard to a point two 
hundred feet east of the intersection of Wolcott Street and 
Federal Way; thence south four hundred and ninety-two feet 
more or less to First South Street; thence west along the sou: 
side of First South Street to the point of beginning. 
WESTMINSTER COLLEGE: Commencing at the southeast corne: 
of 13th East Street and 17th South Street; thence south alom 
the west line of 13th East Street one thousand two hundred 
and seventy-five feet; thence west one hundred and thirty-twr 
feet; thence south one hundred and fifty feet, thence west 
six hundred and twenty-seven feet more or less to the east 
line of 12th East Street; thence north along the east line o 
12th East Street to the center of Emigration Creek; thence 
northwesterly along Emigration Creek to the east line of 12r 
East Street three hundred and fifty-six feet; thence east al 
the south line of Wilson Avenue one hundred and seventy-five 
feet; thence north six hundrt:d and sixty fe'et along the east 
line of 12th East Street to the south line of 17th South Street; 
t t'ence east seven hundred feet to the point of beginning. 
SEC. 51-14-2. AREA REGULATIONS. The minimum lot area 
shall be not less than five thousand (5,000) square feet for a 
single-family dwelling or six thousand (6,000) square feet for 
a two-family dwelling. 
SEC. 51-14-3. SIDE YARD, FRONT YARD, REAR YARD AND HEIGHT 
REGULATIONS. Same as Jor Residential "R-1" District. 
SEC. 51-14-4. CONDITIONAL USES. In a Residential "R-2" 
District the Board of Adjustment may permit as a conditional 
use any conditional use permitted in a Residential "R-1" District, 
subject to the same restrictions contained therein. 
APPENDIX B 
NEW SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 
FOR CHILD Ci\RE 
Lt.LT LAKE CITY OROINANCI! 
No.71of1N1 
IOllld C.,.. FKlllHM.l 
AN ORDINANCE ENDING CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 51 
OF THE REVISED ANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAM. 196.5, RELAT TO ZONING DEFINITIONS BY 
AENUM86AING T TION OF "OECJBEL" TO 
SECTION !il·l-17.!i, CTIONS SM-17.1. ET SEQ .. 
RELATING TO CAY ILITIES. ANO AMENDING 
THE DEFINITION 0 H CUPATION IN SECTION 51· 
2-3'; ADDING SECTION $1...>lA RELATING TO /4. SPECIAL 
EXCEPTION PROVIDING FOR CHILO CARE IN RESIOEN· 
Tl.AL DISTRICTS· ANO AMENDING SECTIONS 18-13-1 
THROUGH 18-13-IJ, RELATING TO THE DEFINITIONS 
APPLICABLE TO CHILDREN'S DAY CARE CENTERS ANO 
RELATED uses AS APPLIED UNDER HEALTH ORDI-
NANCES. 
WHEREAS, It Is the <!Mire of this Council to recoonl1e the 
t.ed for the providing Of quallty chlld care within our commu-
nity; and • 
WHEREAS. If ls the tMllng of 1t19 Coupcll that smell 
grovp care In resldentlal family homfl can provlcte a benefl· 
clal f•mlly atmosphere within the rG"Sldentlal naig,,bot'hoods 
without disrupting normal neivl'\bomood c,,•rKterlstlcs if 
proper balances and safeguards are rcrsoected; and 
WHEREAS. It Is the desire of ttie Councll to acknowte«H: 
the ml•ed use of existing community fecllltlH tNit desire to 
orovlcle, as acceuorv us.es, la~r scale child care or edue•· 
tlonal tacllltles where part.Ing, traffic, pfay, etc. ctin be HSllY 
accommodated wlttiout disturbing the rMldef'ltlal c,,eracter of 
the Mi~borhood; 
THEREFORE. be lt ordained by the City Councll of S.lt 
Lake City, Uta,,: 
SECTION I That C,,epter 2 ot Tltl• SI of the RtNlsed Ordl· 
Mnas of Salt Lake City, Utatl, 1965, as amended. relating to 
definitions, be, and ttie uime Is hereOy amended bY RENUM-
BERING Section Sl-2-17.1 defining "Oeclbel" end ADDING H 
S.Ctlons Sl-2-17.1. 51-2-17.11, SJ.2-17.12. 51·2-17.13. 51-2-17.l•. 51-
2-17.IS. 51-2-17 16 definitions tor tvpn of dav care facllltles; 
•nd AMENDING Section 51-2-J.ti defining "Honie Occupation" 
S.ld amendments stl•ll r&ed H follows: 
Sec. Sl-2-16. Cov.raH. ••• 
Sec 51·2-17.1. O.v Care Persons. associations. corpere-
tlons. Institutions or 19encles providing on 11 regular basis 
care and supervision. (regardless of educational emonast1J to 
Chlldren under fourtHrt veus of ave, In lleu ot care end w-
pervlsion ordJMrlly provided by parents In thielr own homes. 
~~ ~~ ~~~,,;rv,.~;1:r:1 .~~~~1~~v~d,!ctno~~'~.~r-
t11tS 5"111 be classlfled as defined below and Shall be subleci to 
tr... eOPllcable provisions of Tltles 51. 11 and 20 of these ordi-
nances. and appllcebte state law. 
Sec. 51-2-17.11. Dav care centers (nunerl". ornchocls. 
etc.). Persons. associations, lnstlt\Jtlons Of' M>enCles, which 
Movlde day care for three or more chlldref'I and/or ed1..oatlon-
a1 OPOOrtunlflH tor chlldren under aee seven (7), for oertods 
~;;~!t,r;~n ~~t~ ~!" c!:'o!~~~e ~~II c!:::fl, ~~ 
c111ssUlc11tlon as r~lstered hOme dav care or register-ad nome 
Meschools. 
Sec. 51·2-17.12. O.v Care. hOurly cent.-s. Any day C11re 
center. provider. or otti.,. t.clllty where day care and/or edu-
ctitlonel OPPCrlunltle-s are Ot'Ovlded tor three or more chlldren 
tor four {.ti) hours or less In any one d•v Smelt group hourly 
cMy care centers OPl':f'llfed In a provld9r's hOme rrwiv cw•tltv 
tor c11ulflc11tlon as revlstered hOme d•v care or reolstered 
home Dr'MChoolS. 
Sec. 51-2-17.13. D•v Care/ Preschool. A oenon. nsocl• 
Hon. Institution or agency which advertises ltMU as a pr• 
school and wt'llch orovldes care end emDl'laslzn ~•Ilona! 
OPPQr'tunltles tor chlldren under age seven C7). NotwlthstarO-
lnt eduutlon11I emotiasls, It 11 chlld recelvn care fOf' more 
th.an four <•l hours oer day, the tecllltv sh•ll be rt'9ul•ted as 
a dav care center. Smell preschools Cunct.r 7 Chltdrenl ooer•t-
ed In orovlder's home may auallfy tor classification es regis-
tered home preschool 
Sec. 51·2·17.l•. Day care. non-revlstwed heme. A oenon 
which uses his/her prlnclpal place of rnldenca to provlcte day 
care for no more than t'NO 121 chlldr9n. 
Sec. 51-2-17.15. D•v care, reiglstered home. A person Who 
uses his/Mr prlncloat place of rnl<Wnce to provl<W dav care 
for small groups ln exces.s of two chltdren. The group size at 
any given llme Shall not exceed six. Including the provld&r's 
own chUQNrl under ~six. The aroup.shall not include more 
than t'NQ Infants Cunde< two vursJ or addltlonal scl'IOcl ae. 
children unlns In compliance with state rl!'lilulatlons applica-
ble to group comPOSlflon. A revlstered home day care mav be 
conducted u an nour center or dav care canter ~Ing on 
whether anv child recelws day care for PttrlOds exc.eecllng 
tour l_.l houn oer dav. 
Sec. 51-2-17 16. Dav care, reQlstered home prescl'IOcl. A 
oiers.on who us.es his/her prlnclpal piece of residence to pr~ 
vlde educational OPOOrtunlfles for Pt".......,rammar school &ve 
children (under &ee 7) In small grou~. The aroup size at 1nv 
alven time shall not exceed six, lncludlnv the provl<»r's own 
cf'llldr~ under age six. If any ch ltd, other than the e>rovl<Wr ;s, 
remains fOt" a period In excess of four (_.)hours, the Dt"HChool 
shall also be considered IS a day care center~ be subleci to 
IPPllcable revulatlons. 
Sec 51·2·17.S Decibel ..... 
Sec. 51·2·l4. Horne Occuoatlon. "Home Occupation" shall 
~:d'non11~~ ::e~~~~~~n:l~1~~ d~'Wt'ng11 u~:~d+~s ~~ 
rv use Is clearly lncldantal and secondarv to the use of the 
d\Wlllng for dW'9'1111'19 PUrPOSM and does not Change the cNr-
actar thereof and In connection with which there ls no display, 
no stock in trade, and no employees. Said home shall be the 
princloal residence of the occupants. The tiome occuoatlon 
Shall not Include the sale of commodities. axcaot those wtdeh 
are Produced on the premises, and shall not Involve the us.a of 
anv accessory bulld1ng, vard or activity outside of the main 
bulldlna. 
In partlcular a home occupation Includes, but Is not llmlt-
~~:.,;:,~~};:F::::~=~·~t1S{. ~r:;r:~1:~ 
eral practice of his profession; the occuo.atlon of a dressmak· 
er, milliner or seamstress who hlS no assistants; the occupa. 
tlon of a musician wno teache'S voice, Plano or other lndlvldual 
musical Instrument llmlted to a slngle PUPii at a time; and 
non-registered home dev care IS defined In Section 51·2·17.1.4. 
In all cases where a home occupation Is belnv env8"<1 In 
there shall be no advertising of said occupatloo. no wlndOw 
dlsplavs or slons except as l'lerelnatter Pttrmlttael, •n no em-
e>lovees emoloved other than persons residing at the ml· 
dance. 
Honie occuo.atlon shall not be lntllf'Preted to Include the 
following: barber shoos 1nd beautv shops; commercial sta-
bles; kennels; rear estate Offices, other than an fncflvldual In 
his own home as outllned above; or the tHchlng of dance to 
more than one PUPii at a time; band Instrument Instruction In 
grouPS; and rl!'lillsterael home day care or revlst~ed hOma 
Pf"HCl'IOclS. 
Sec. S1·2·l5. Lot.••• 
SECTION 2. That Chapter 6 of Tltle SI of the Revised Ordl· 
nances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, ratafl"9 to provisions for 
transltlonat zones, be and the same herebv Is amended bv 
ADDING Section 51-6-U relall"'lll to a soeclal exceotlon provid-
ing for chlld care In resldenllal districts. 
Sec. 51-6-1-4. Soeclal Excee>tlon-Chlld care In reslclentlal 
districts. Where not otharwls.e authorized bv this tltla, wher"l In 
tM OPlnlon of the Board of Adlustn"ant the lnte-rests of the 
community wlll be served thereby, the Board of Adlustment 
·mav permit as a special axc9Pflon resldentlal districts to be 
used for provldl"'lll Child care PUrsuant to the following Pr"OVI· 
slons and procedures: 
{I) Non.registered Home Dav care. Nori.registered home 
day care. as defined In Chapter 2 of this tttla, mav be conduct-
ed ln the home of the Drovlder of care as a home occ:upatlon. 
sublect to the restrictions sat forth for hOme occupations soecl· 
fled In Section 51·2-J.4 Of this Title. No business revenue lie.nu 
or conclltlonal us.e Pttrmlf shall be required. 
(2) Revlstered home dav care and home Pt"ctsehool faclll-
fles. A oers.on desiring to register to ooerare a registered 
home day care or registered home preschOol tacllltv es de-
fined In Chae>ter 2 of this Tltla In their hQr,ie In a resldentlal 
district, IS an accessory use. must obtain a condltlonal use 
permit from the ZonlD& Dep.artm..,t and a revul•forv P9rmlt 
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trom the He-alftt [)Hl.art~nt. The Pl!f'mlHee It, also resc>0nslble 
to obtain approorl11te llcenslng where appllcable lrom the 
Slate ol Utah under Sections SS-9-L et s.q,, Utah Code Anno-
tated. 195.3. 
cation c~u~r"t!enesu~~~~~ '::: ~ir!:,· ='~':t ~~ !~~ 
clal non-tran1fef'"able condition.al use permit. The fee for wld 
P9f""mlt shall be ten dollars CS10.00J As a part of the as:>olka-
tlon, the applicant must submit dOCumentatlon demorlstratlng 
that· 
(ll The appllcant resldn It the hOme In which the 
buslneu will be conducted; 
(2l At no time shall the 
care or P'lome preschool services 
c:eedl1'19 the mulmum specified b 
17 .16. The ages and number of all cared for or 
partlclpatll'l9 shall be stated tooether 100 of ti~ 
each chlld ls or wlll be under the ae>Pllcant's care eech day 
~~: ~~'r"::::i °!~~Z~ t!'1:r1on period 01 care 
p.,- d•v. appllcant de-sires to be considered a day care cenfel'" 
as OPPOWd to hOurly care center. 
(51 The ovtdoOr play area for the home day care or 
home Pf'llSChool shall be located In the rear or side vards of 
the heme for the protection and safety of the children and for 
the orotectlon of the nelghborhOod. JI such vards are fenced. 
the t.nces must comply with zoning ordinances. 
(0) The applicant and permltee of a home day care 
and/or heme preschool must agree to conduct the service In a 
manner of a heme occu;')atlon, te>wlt: Th&re shall be no adver-
tising of said occuSMtlon, buslneu or service, no wlndoW or 
ottter signs or a1so1avs. no emo)oyHS, no use of anv accessory 
bulldlngs, and nc;. olav or vard equipment located In the front 
vard. The use ot the home tor the services of providing chHd 
care shall be clearly Incidental and wcondary to the use ot the 
ctwelllng tor ctwelllng PUrPOWs and shall not chanue th• char-
acter of the hOme or the nelvhborhOOd. 
(7) Aoollc11nt snail agree to abide by standards s.et by 
the Healftt Department unde-r Chapter 13 of Title 18 wner-e 
aoollcable. 
(8J That the care and supervision Of the dllldr&n be 
conducted In a manner which Is not 11 oubtlc nulunce to the 
neighborhood. 
C9J Proof of aoorOPrlate llcenslnoa from the State ot 
Utati where 1100Ucabte, or Dasls upon which exemption there-
from Is claimed. 
<lOJ Names and addrn.sn of record orooertv owners 
of rand surrounding aoollcant's residence as rettected bY an 
ownBshlo olat. It Is lnlencled this stiall lnctude owners of 
preperty situated within an 85-toot parameter around the par-
e&I contalnll'l9 aoollcant's residence. 
(11) Once granted. a permlttee mav reQUest annual 
renewal bv submitting an •C>Pllcatlon with anv uodaled Infor-
mation and a renewal fff of Sl.00. A rene-w11! may be ap-
oroved admlnlstratlvety bv Zoning Director flnc:llng: (lJ ap-
par1tnt comollance with criteria and 121 the absence of any 
pendln9 comolalnts 119alnst the oermlttee. Should any corn-
otalnts be pending or unresolved. action of renewal shall be 
staved and deferred untlt res.olutlon of the comolalnt. 
lbJ Hearing, wavier and oermlt Issuance. The lnltlal 
appllcatlon Cnon-renr-Hals) for a SPKlal exception condltlonal 
use permit to ooerate a registered 
tered home oreschool a: an acceuor-v 
trlct shall be subiect to the review and a 
of Adlustment to assure compliance with standa 
above. After the Zoning Director determl~ an Ion 
appean complete and In comollance, the aPPllcatlon shall be 
tcheduled for a hearing and review betore the Board at one of 
Its r99u1arly scheduled meetings. Notlce of the meeting will be 
malted to the 1dlolnlng property owners listed on Ca)(10l 
above er least one weeK orlor to the meeting. Howe~. said 
t\eartng and review by the Board may be waived and conc:ll-
tlonar approval luued bY the Zoning Director, lf the applicant 
presents with the aoollcatlon. the signature of said surround-
ing orootrty owners speclfvlng they consent or Mve no ob*-
tlon to the orooosed accessory use. The consent and slGnature 
of one oartv appearing of record will be held sufficient to give 
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constnx:tlve notlctt to all parties noldlng 1n1erests In me i>arcel 
and to constitute conwnt tot' said parcel. Mearlngs or conwnts 
are not ae>ollcabltt or required for apgllcatlons for ~als 
wtilch mav bit granted on a staff review as described In 
<aJ(llJ ebo.w. Approval wHI be sublect.to obtaining a oermn 
from the Health Oecartment before Zoning ~y luue a condl· 
tlonel oermJt or renewal. 
f c J Post oermlt review and hearing. l nasmuch as ap.. 
prov•ls of lnUlal permits and renewals are bas.ed uc;ion rePrtt-
,,...,,atfons aQrNlng to comply with standards s.&f forth above, 
Issuance of the oermlt either admlnlstratlvttlv, or aHer hear-
ing bv the Board, will bit sublect to the continuing JurlSdlction 
of the Board Rttvlew by the Board of Adiustment may be 
requested bv the petition of anv adminlstratlV"lt officer or ad-
joining orooertv owner funder (a)(10) above) allevlng failure 
bv the applicant and/or O&rmlttN to comolv with the stan-
dards set fOrth above. Said oetltlon shall state In Partkurarty 
the suooortlng tacts and details Jvstlfylng the f"eVlew tor non-
compflance. Said review shall be cOOducted h the Board of 
.A.:livstment, after giving at least seven davs wrltten notice of 
the hearing to the oermlttee. surro1.indl119 prooertv owners and 
each petitioner. UPOn review. the Board mav enter an order 
as It deems appropriate. dlsquatlfvfng ~ ellglbllltv of the 
ciermittee for renewals or re/ssuance of Pe"rmlts, ordering 
compliance. revoking or suspending the Conditional use per. 
mlt, ana;or anv other necessary administrative or legal ac-
tion 
Cdl Day care centers. nur-s.e-rles and preschool. All chlld 
dav care centers Oncludlng hourlv care centers!. preschools 
or other simllar d'tltd care facllltles. other than r"'lstered 
home dav care and revlsterecl home Preschools, providing 
chlld dav care shall be considered a business rec1ulrlng a busl-
nt""ss revenue Hcense Issued only aHer the Prior approval of 
the Zoning ~rtment and a regulatory Hcense from the 
Health Oec>ortment. 
Ill Soe-clar exC$tlon In "R·l" ftlrou-ah "R-5A" dis-
tricts. Where not otf'lerwlse allowed In r~ldentlal districts. a 
chlldren's dav care faclllty, lncludlng centers. hourly centers 
and Preschools (other than r"'lsterecl home day ca,.. or Pre-
school J mav apo1v to the Board of Ad[vstment for a soedal 
excePtion to conduct Its buslnt"SS In a Resident/at "R-1" 
fhrough "R·5A" District Provided: 
Cal Said business Is conducted as an accessory use 
within a church bulldlng(sJ, community center, oubllc or 
seml·oubHc OOltdlnvs. or oubUc or Private school Institutions 
orovldlng full currh:ulum to chlldren of grammar school age 
or older 
fbl The oermlttee has obtained ac>oroval from the 
State of Utah. to ooerate the prooosect facility In comll(iance 
with state regulations, and Is other.Hise In ~ standlnv with 
State. or Is exempt from such regulatfons. 
fc) The maximum number of children wttlch can be 
cared for at a Given time tn the facllltv fas determined bv the 
"'eal1'1 department on tne capacity of the fadllty or otherwise 
soeclfied bv the StateJ Is si:>eclflecl and may not be exceeded. 
ldl That the bulldlnv site must Provide adeQuate 
sPace for off.street parking of Parents and staff and safe off. 
street areas for dropping and picking up children. 
{eJ T'1at the manner of eperatlon or the care or super. 
vision of the children and related activities dOes not constltvfe 
a PUbllc nuisance In the nervhbOrhood. 
able con~ltT~s ~;,~~o~~~=~~r .'ti~~~~ ~:::;i; 
Including maximum numbers of cMJdren to ensure the PUrPGS-
~ of this ordinance are preserved. 
SECTIONS J. That Sections l~ll-1 thr'OUQh 181-JJ.IJ of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1965, retatlngi to 
the "chfldren's care centers", be, and the same hereby tre, 
AMENDED to read as fOllOW$: 
Sec. l~IJ.1. Definitions. For the ouroose of ftlls chaP"ter 
the fotrowinv Phrases, terms and words shall h•ve the mffn-
ings herein given: 
fl) Dav Care Center. Chlldren's day care center Shall 
mean anv nurs.erv, Pe"rSOn, association, corPOl"atlon. institu-
tion, or aQency Which Provides care and supef"Vlslon for three 
or more chlfdren under 18 vears of aGe In lleu of care and 
suPervlslon ordlnarlly provfdecl by parents In their own homes 
for oerlOds of more than tour (.f) hours In anv one dav with or 
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without chartie. Rl!91stere<I home day care and rl!91sf~ 
home ?f'eschools. C~lned In Sections 51-2-1715 and 17 16), 
mav also be Included If children are care<I for more than tour 
("') not.irs per day Hourly dav care centers are excluded. 
f2J Hourly Dav Care Center. HOUf"IY dav care cente-r 
shall Include any day care center, r&illste-red horn& day care 
or r&ilistered hon'le preschool (as defined In Sections 51-2-1715 
and 51-2-17.161 or any nurwrv. ~non, auoclatlon, corPOra-
llon, lnstltvtlon or agency which provides care and supervi-
sion for three or more children under 18 Yffn of age In llev of 
care and supervision ordlnarlly provl~ by parents In their 
own nom.s tor periods of less thant tour ("') hours In any one 
day with or without charge. 
(JJ Preschool. PrHChoot shall Include any r&g1lstered 
home preschool and/or, any person, auoclatlon, corp0ratlon, 
Institution or agency wt'lld'I advertlS6 ltwtr ro be a preschool 
and wtilch provid.s care and educatlonal taclllfles tor chUdren 
under ~ven (7J veers 01 age with or without charge tor les.s 
rtu11n four ("l hours per day. 
("') Exemption .... 
Sec. 11-13-2. Regulatory Permit Required. It shall be un-
lawful for anv Pet'son to conduct, eperate, carry on or main-
tain a lacllltv provldlnv day care as defined In Section 51-2-
17 1, et seq_ wllhoul having a llcense IS.SIJeCI by the State of 
Utatt, If applicable, and a reQulatory permit from the Health 
Deoartment II shall be unlawful for any person to ooierate or 
carry on en hourly day care center or prescttool without first 
obtaining a P&f'"mit frcm the Salt Lake City-County HHlth 
DePertment to do so. 
Sec. 18-lJ-2.l Business license rMiulred lt shall be un-
l•wful !or any Person to conduct. OPerate. carry on or main-
tain a ctllldren's day care center. hourly day care center, or 
oreschooL excludlnv registered home day care or ttome Pr• 
schOol. as herein defined, without addltlonally obtaining a 
business license from the Salt Lake Cltv Llcen!.e ~rtment. 
Sec. 11-JJ-l. APOllcatlon for tlcl!'nse or Permit. Every Pet""-
s.on desiring to obtain an hourly day care center, preschool or 
dav care center flcense excru01ne regJstert'd home day care 
and registered home preschool shall make an aPQllcatlon to 
tt'le license dep.art~t of Salt Lake Cltv. Every penon dc!slr-
lng 10 otitaln a condltlonal use permit tor revlstered home day 
care or revlstered hOrne Pl"eschoof sttall make appllcatlon for 
permits to the Healttt and Zonlnv Departments of Salt Lake 
Cltv Said apPllcatlons shall Include lUch Information and 
data under oath rHP«flnv the classlflcatlon and use tor which 
tt'le license or permit Is requHt«I as the license. Zonlnv or 
the Health OePartments mey prescribe, Including a de-s.crl~ 
tlon of the cttlld care facHlty and servlce-s and a stat~nt of 
ttte personnel programs that ere to be used therefor. 
Sec. Jl-IJ-.4. Fees. Ttte Health Deoartrnent Dermlt fM for a 
registered home day care or a rl!"Ollstere-d home preschOol (de-
fined In Sections 51-2-17.15 and 51-2-17.16J, Shall be one dollar 
(Sl 00) per annum or any part th&reof. A regulatory lkens.e 
permit fee for all ofhe.r chlld care facllitles. lncludlne hourly 
day care center, preschool or day care centers other than 
re-giJst~ed home day care or reelster«I home Pf"eschools, shall 
beS15.00. 
Sec. 11-13-5. Re-fe-rral to HHlth MNrtment. Ui:ion receipt 
of an aop!icatlon for a permit for a registered hOme day care 
or a registered preschool. or UPOn the re-celpt of an aDPllcatlon 
tor a Ileen~ permit tor a fbellltv provldlnv child care Gr pre-
school services. said appllcatlOflS for P&t'"m/ts and/or llcensn 
s.hall be referred by Zoning or Lkenslngi DeNrtments to the 
Health Dieoartment. 
Sec 18-13-6. lsSYance of permit up0n Inspection of premis-
es. Up0n re-ceiPt of an aDPllcatlon for a permit or llcens.e. the 
dlre-ctor of the Heantt Department or ttls authorlz«I reprftMn-
tatlve, may make an Inspection of the premises to be used as 
a chlld care fKllltv. If the premises are found to be In compli-
ance with the city ordinances and rules and reQulatlons of the 
h&alth d&partment, a permit Shall be Issued by the Health 
OeNrtment approvln9 the use of such facllltv, subleci to zon-
lnv approval. The Board of Health stiall cause a COPY of such 
~m1t to bt fll«I with the license or zonlne department. No 
llcense or conditlonat use s:iermlt shall be ls.sued without a 
COPY of tne reeulatory permit or ttlie written approval of the 
5 
HHlth Department. Anv lkense Issued without approval from 
Zoning end Health Deoairtments Is volCS.ble. In the event the 
Df'eml!f:s uPOn such Inspection are tound not In ~tlsfectorv 
compliance with the ordlnane@S and the rules and revulatlons 
of the Health Oeoartment, no such l)IJf"mlt $1'1all be Issued and 
no license or condlflonal u~ l)IJf"mlt Shal! be Issued. 
Sec. 18-13-7 Duration of licen"9. The llcenses Ind Def1Tllts 
Pf'"ovloed tor In this cMoter shall run from the orlglnal date of 
epprovel to December Jl ot the vear In wtllch It Is apeir~. 
All renewars !hall nm for 1 12-month period starting Jllnuarv 
1 and ending December 31 of NCh vHr, unless sooner r• 
"""""· SK. 18-13-8. Susi>enslon Ind revocation of permit end 11-
cense. The permit Issued under this chapter mt!IV be suSPenD-
ed or revo«.ed bv the director of the Health department uPOn 
the vlolatlon bv the notder of anv of the 1.-ms of this ordi-
nance. where..1POn the permit Issued $1'1all automatkalJv be 
SUSPended or revc*.ed. Excet>t as hereinafter provided, the 
susP<Msion or revocation of said l)IJf"mlt 5h•H take f:ffect thirty 
davs after written notice bv the director of the HHlth C>eoart-
menl to the permlttee ac:tvlslnG the latter of the contemolated 
wSPenslon or revocation llnd setting forth the rHsons tor such 
ectton. 
Sec. 18-13-9. Id. HHrlng. At anv time before the susoen-
slon or revocation date, permlttee mllv request a hearing on 
wid Dl'oPOSed scuienslon or revocation before the Board of 
Health which board shall pass flnallv upon the matter of such 
:Ut!'::~~o;;r~eci'~~~Ji'~fr"iuTv~ ~r~ o~~ ,r:~:t~tt:C~:~~ 
Ing. Action bv the Board shall be referred to Zoning and Li-
censing Departments. 
Sec. l&-ll-10. Id. Erner9<encv. Hearing waived. When In the 
oolnlon of the director of the Health Dec>artm~t there exists 
an emergencv which mt!lv endanger the pybllc hNlth or sat~ 
tv, the director of the Health DePartm~t Is emPOWereel to 
declare an ~gency and lmmedlatetv susoend anv or •II 
such permits as mev be reaulred, without 1 hearing or Drlor 
notice. 
SK. 18-13-11. Operation without permit dally offense. The 
operation of anv d'llld care facllltv without hllvlng In full force 
and effect required permits and llcens.e from ttie Cltv to OPer-
ate shall be In vlolatlon of this chapter and Heh dav of OPet"•-
tlon without such permit belnsi In tull force and effect shall be 
construed as e ~parate violation and pynlShable as sueh. 
Sec. 18-ll-12. Plan apeiroval reaulred for new- or •lfentd 
l•cllltles .... 
Sec. 18-ll-lJ. Inspection bY Salt Lake Cltv-Countv Health 
Deollrtment. tt Shall be the dutv of the director of the Health 
Oepertm~t or his authorized recresentatlve. to visit and In-
spect all hourlv care centers. preschools, and dav care c~ters 
for the PUrPOSe of determining the sanitary conditions therein 
and to determine wtiether the s.ame are being conducted In 
compllllnce wltf'l this ordinance and the rutes and re-;aulatlont 
of the Salt Lake Clty-Countv Health Department. 
SK. 18-IJ-U. Posting and tlllng of results.••• 
SECTION •. This ordinance Sf'laU take effect uPOn Its first 
PUbl~::=· by the Cltv Council dt Salt Lake Cltv. Utah, this 
2fttl day of October, 1911. 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Kathryn Mar$1'1all 
CITY RECORDER 
/ti Palmer DePaulls 
CHAIRMAN 
Transmitted to Ma·tor on Qctgt,.r JO. 1911 
Mavor's Action: 
ATTEST: 
ISi Kathryn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER 
~~~~'ijot 1911 
?ubllshed Nov. 1. 1911 
D-1' 
6 
/s/ Ted l. Wilson 
MAYOR 
APPENDIX C 
UTAH STATUTE 
10-9-15. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BOARD'S DECISION -
TIME LIMITATION. The city or any person aggrieved by 
any decision of the board of adjustment may have and 
maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any 
court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition 
for such relief is presented to the court within thirty 
days after the filing of such decision in the office 
of the board. 
